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Abstract. Electronic voting (e-voting) systems can greatly enhance the
efficiency, and potentially, the transparency of national elections. How-
ever, the security of such systems is an area of on-going research. The
literature for secure e-voting is predominantly concerned with 1-out-of-m
voting strategies, where m is the number of candidates running for the
elections. This paper presents a case study of cryptologic protocols for
secure e-voting systems that use preferential voting strategies.
1 Introduction
Many types of voting strategies are employed around the world. Although there
has been extensive research for cryptologic protocols for binary voting strategies
(yes or no votes), the attention to preferential voting systems [2] is minimal. In
such voting systems, each voter is required to rank, provide an order of preference
for, the candidates. If no candidate receives a majority, more than half of first
preference votes, the candidate with the lowest first preference vote is eliminated.
Votes of the eliminated candidate are redistributed to the remaining candidates
depending on the second preference. Repeatedly, more candidates are eliminated
until one reaches a majority.
A notion of security for e-voting systems can be summarised as the confi-
dentiality service for individual voter-vote relationships. This can be formalised
as Conf (ID ,Vote), where Conf (· · · ) is a confidentiality service, ID is a voter’s
identity, and Vote is the vote of that voter. Such a security is achieved using one
of two techniques, namely (ID ,Conf (Vote)) or (Conf (ID),Vote). The vote ei-
ther remains confidential or anonymous even after the end of the elections. This
paper will adapt a proposal from each of these two techniques to preferential
voting systems and study the resulting efficiency.
2 Preferential Voting using Homomorphic Encryption
This section will discuss the use of homomorphic encryption in secure e-voting
systems, which uses the (ID ,Conf (Vote)) technique, to accommodate a prefer-
ential voting strategy.
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2.1 Homomorphic Encryption
Assume that Ek(v) is a public encryption function, where k is a random value
chosen by the voter and v is a vote, and D(· · · ) is the corresponding private
decryption function known only to the election officials, such that they form a
public-key encryption system. The encryption function is said to be homomor-
phic when Ek1(v1)  Ek2(v2) = Ek3(v1 ⊕ v2), where  and ⊕ are some binary
operators. In the LHS of the previous equation, the ciphertexts of individual
votes can be combined using a binary operator, . The RHS of the equation
suggests that such a combining operation will result in another ciphertext, the
decryption of which will result in an accumulation of the individual votes, v1⊕v2.
Thus, it will be possible to compute the accumulation of the individual votes
without having to retrieve the individual votes.
The Paillier cryptosystem [5] contains a homomorphic encryption function,
used for voting, which operates on the congruence class mod N2, where N =
pq, and p and q are large prime integers such that the factorisation problem is
intractable. The next section will use the above cryptosystem.
2.2 Preferential Voting and Paillier Cryptosystem
Baudron et al. [3] proposed a novel technique for the design of 1-out-of-m elec-
tronic voting systems using Paillier cryptosystem. The vote is structured in a
special form to be combined using homomorphic encryption.
We propose the following simple adaptation of the message structure to de-
sign an electronic preferential voting system. In this system, the voter is expected
to vote for a particular sequence of candidates rather than to vote for the can-
didates themselves, as was proposed in the original scheme.
Preferential vote: A system constant M = 2dlog2 le is chosen, where l is the
maximum number of voters in a constituency. The officials assign a unique
number, i ∈ {0, · · · ,m!}, to every possible sequence (permutation) of m
candidates, and accommodate for empty votes. The voter must provide a
rank for every candidate or submit an empty vote. The size of the vote
in this cryptosystem is log2Mm! bits. That is each sequence is represented
by a counter that can count up to M . The voter encrypts the vote, M i,
using a homomorphic encryption scheme for the election officials. Equation 1
presents a pictorial representation of the vote (M i), which chooses the first
sequence of candidates, namely, i = 0.
Mi︷ ︸︸ ︷
|
dlog2 le︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 00︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=m!
|
dlog2 le︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 00︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=m!−1
| · · · |
dlog2 le︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 00︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=2
|
dlog2 le︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 01︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=1
|
dlog2 le︷ ︸︸ ︷
00 · · · 00︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=0
| (1)
The public key for a Paillier cryptosystem must be generated such that the
modulus Mm! < N2 so that the entire vote can be encrypted in one block.
When m = 20 and l = 1000, the size of the modulus is: |N | = 10 × 20! bits.
Clearly, such a size for a modulus is impractical as numerous exponentiation
operations are required.
3 Preferential Voting using Mix-Networks
This section will discuss the use of mix-networks in secure e-voting system. It
presents an implementation, using the (Conf (ID),Vote) technique, of a robust
mix-network for a simple and relatively secure preferential e-voting system.
3.1 Mix-Networks
Let D be a decryption algorithm computable only by the mix-network. Let
φ : Zn → Zn be a randomly chosen secret permutation function. The operation
of the mix-network can be described by the following operation: mφ(i) = D(ci),
where i ∈ Zn. The LHS of the previous equation is a random sorted set of
plaintexts, mφ(i), corresponding to the RHS, decryption, D, of a set of input
ciphertexts, ci.
The input to the mix-network could be of the form (ID ,Conf (Vote)), and
the output would be of the form (Conf (ID),Vote). Thus, a mix-network can
be viewed as a confidentiality translation service translating the confidentiality
service from the vote (or data) to the identity.
Abe [1] proposed a mix-network using ElGamal encryption algorithm in re-
encrypting the set of input messages, Iv = {ci|i ∈ Zn}, to produce a randomly
permuted set of output messages, Ov = {mφ(i)|i ∈ Zn}. The next section will
use the mix-network by Abe.
3.2 Preferential Voting and Mix-Networks
The mix-network by Abe can be used to construct electronic secret ballot voting
schemes. In such schemes, the vote need not be in a special form as the tabulation
phase is conducted using the plaintext vote anonymised. In contrast to schemes
based upon homomorphic encryption, the size of input messages does not directly
affect the efficiency of the mix-network.
In electronic preferential voting employing mix-network, the vote can be of
the form an integer ranging from 1 to m!, where m is the number of candidates
running for the election. Thus, the message size is dlog2(m!)e = 62 bits, where
m = 20. Let j ∈ Zl be an index into a list of voters, so that l is the number of
voters.
We propose a generic e-voting scheme utilising the above mix-network as
follows:
Set-up: The election officials publish the parameters for a threshold decryption
cryptosystem [4], (E,D), such that Ek(· · · ) is the public encryption function,
where k is a random value chosen by the voter, and D(· · · ) is a t-out-of-n
decryption function.
Vote submission: Each voter j:
1. selects a sequence, ij ∈ {1, · · · ,m!}, to represent his/her preference;
2. encrypts the selection, e.g: Ekj (ij);
3. identifies itself to the vote collecting official to establish its identity, ID ;
and,
4. communicates the encrypted vote, E(ij), to the vote collecting official.
The voting official verifies the identity of every voter and forwards the set of
votes from valid voters, U = {Ekj (ij)}, to the mix-network.
Vote mixing: The mix-network permutes and decrypts the objects from the
set U and outputs a set of plaintext votes V , such that the correspondence
between the objects in U and the objects in V are a secret.
Vote tabulation: The election official electronically processes the plaintext
vote in V by using a program for counting the preferences and calculating
the elected candidate.
The processing cost is mainly contributed by the mixing operation. The mix-
network is composed of a number of gates, and the computational cost for each
gate is 23.6 modular exponentiations [1]. Each voter generates exactly one input
message to the mix-network. Providing 2 log2 l − 1 delay [1] per input, where
l = 1000 is the number of inputs to the mix-network, total computational cost
of the mix-network is 23.6(2 log2 l − 1)t = 448400 modular exponentiations.
4 Conclusion
The size of the electronic vote for a preferential voting system is inherently larger
than a 1-out-of-m voting system, when the number of candidates,m, increases. In
preferential voting system, the size of the vote is at least log2(m!) bits. Therefore
the voting systems using some form of homomorphic encryption [3] tend to be
inefficient or impractical.
Voting systems that employ mix-networks, on the other hand, do not re-
quire a special form for the electronic vote. The computational complexity is not
adversely affected by the number of candidates. Therefore, mix-network based
voting systems are ideally suited for preferential voting systems. Future research
will be directed towards the design of more efficient robust mix-networks.
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